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Abstract 
 
Financial intermediation theory assigns banks a unique role in the resolution of information 
asymmetry, while monetary theory assigns banks a unique role in money creation and the 
transmission of monetary policy. The bank’s willingness to lend depends on perceptions of the 
project’s payoffs and the moral rectitude of the borrowers, while the bank’s ability to lend 
depends on the adequacy of the bank’s capital and the stance of monetary policy. Small firms are 
largely dependent on bank financing - information asymmetry, moral hazard and switching costs 
restrict access to alternate financing sources. If firms were constrained by their bank’s ability to 
lend, measures of bank capital would be significant determinants of the firm’s growth. By 
identifying specific bank-borrower relationships, we explore the hypothesis that a bank’s capital 
adequacy situation has the potential to influence lending decisions and hence affect the bank’s 
asset structure and the small firm’s ability to finance operations. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
inancial markets require firms to hold capital as a cushion against contingencies and to protect creditors 
from agency costs of debt. In the context of capital structure theory, a firm will hold that level of capital 
that will maximize the value of the firm within the unique advantages and constraints it may face. To 
ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system, bank regulators (The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
The Federal Reserve System, and state and federal chartering agencies) impose additional capital requirements that 
influence the capital structure of banking firms. The introduction of risk adjusted capital requirements together with 
the banks ability to allocate resources between assets of different risk, has created the potential for influencing the 
asset structure of banks subject to those capital requirements. Bank loans have long been considered special in the 
transmission of monetary policy, and the resolution of information asymmetry for small firms. In the absence of 
reliable and verifiable information about expected project payoff characteristics and the moral rectitude of the 
borrower, small firms that do not have access to alternate sources of credit may find themselves bound to their bank 
(the “hold-up” problem). Growth opportunities for the small firm are likely to be constrained by the bank‟s asset 
allocation policy.
1
 The actions of the banking sector in allocating between riskier and safer asset classes may also 
have the unintended consequence of causing a credit crunch and affecting real economic activity. 
 
The theory of financial intermediation is closely associated to the resolution of information asymmetry. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that information asymmetry might hinder the working of markets, while Leland 
and Pyle (1977), Campbell and Kracaw (1980) and Diamond (1984) showed that information production could 
counter market frictions. Fama (1985), James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), James and Wier (1990) and 
Diamond (1991) showed that bank loans are unique in the resolution of information asymmetry, while Slovin, 
Johnson and Glascock (1992) emphasized that bank loans are especially unique in the resolution of information 
asymmetry for small firms. Rajan (1992) and Peterson and Rajan (1994) showed that small firms are especially 
dependent on their bank for their financing needs. 
__________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
The banking system is also the focus of the lending view of monetary policy transmission mechanisms (King 
(1986)). Banks provide unique services (Fama (1985), James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989)) by acquiring 
F 
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private information over time (Diamond (1991), Rajan (1992), Yamori and Murakami (1999)), which provides the 
incumbent banks with an information advantage over other creditors. Banks use this information to influence the 
price and availability of credit (Pertersen and Rajan (1994), Athavale and Edmister (1999)). Banks respond to 
incentives created by risk based capital requirements (Berger and Udell (1994), Peek and Rosengren (1995), 
Brinkman and Horvitz (1995), Park (1999)) by reallocating assets to meet capital adequacy requirements and avoid 
regulatory sanction. Regulatory capital requirements thus have the potential to hinder the capital allocation function 
and affect real economic activity. 
 
This generally accepted framework of financial intermediation and monetary policy transmission suggests 
that small firms otherwise qualified for credit, may be constrained by their bank‟s ability to lend and their bank‟s 
asset allocation decisions. 
 
Regulators require banks to meet capital adequacy requirements in order to ensure the safety and soundness 
of the financial system. Regulatory capital requirements are designed to reduce moral hazard, reduce the agency cost 
of debt, reduce the risk of bank failure, increase public confidence in the financial system and reduce losses to the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
2
 The regulatory regime attempts to balance between the cost of excessive 
regulation (“credit crunch”) and the cost of too little regulation (“regulatory forbearance”). However, the risk based 
capital standards implemented by the regulators have the potential for affecting both the capital structure and the 
asset structure of the bank. The high cost of regulatory sanction (prompt corrective action, mandatory closure, and 
least cost resolution) incorporated in the provisions of the FDIC Improvement Act, creates the incentives for banks 
to respond to capital adequacy requirements by changing asset allocations. Since changing capital structure may be 
costly (Park (1999)), banks can achieve the objective of adjusting their risk-weighted capital by changing the 
composition of assets in their portfolio. 
 
Extant empirical research (Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Berger and Udell (1994), and Jacques and Nigro 
(1997)) has evidenced that banks faced with regulatory capital constraints change asset composition by substituting 
away from high risk-weighted assets. Our research builds on this and other related research (Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994), Peek and Rosengren (1995), Brinkman and Horvitz (1995), and Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1998)) by 
identifying a small firm with its bank, and exploring the hypothesis that the small firm‟s ability to finance operations 
may be constrained by its bank‟s capital adequacy situation.3 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
make this direct association. 
 
Data, Methodology And Results 
 
If the bank‟s investment decisions were independent of financial and regulatory constraints, we would not 
expect business firms to be constrained by their bank. However as shown by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Berger and 
Udell (1994), and Jacques and Nigro (1997), the existence of regulatory capital constraints may create incentives for 
banks to substitute away from high risk-weighted assets, thus increase their capital ratios without increasing capital, 
and avoid market and regulatory sanction. While the influence of the bank on the firm, during periods of “tight” 
credit has been investigated (Bernanke and Lown (1991), Peek and Rosengren (1995), Berger and Udell (1994), 
Berger et.al. (1995), Brinkman and Horvitz (1995)), such an influence may persist even during periods of relatively 
“easy” credit. We therefore chose a recent period of relatively “easy” credit (from the last quarter of 1995 to the last 
quarter of 1998) to test the hypothesis that the small firm‟s ability to finance operations may be constrained by its 
bank‟s capital adequacy situation. We obtained a preliminary sample of 128 small manufacturing firms (defined as 
firms with primary SIC code between 2000 and 3999, and average quarterly revenues of less than dollars twenty-
five million during the year 1995) from Compact Disclosure. Firm specific quarterly data on sales, total assets and 
debt-equity ratio was obtained from Compact Disclosure. From the Million Dollar Directory, we obtained the 
primary bank identified by each firm over the period 1995 to 1998. Bank specific quarterly data on core capital, tier 
1 capital and total capital was obtained from the FDIC Call and Thrift Financial Reports.
4
 Firms that had not listed a 
primary bank (16) or had named a non-depository institution (4) or where complete financial information about the 
firm and its bank were not available (22) were eliminated from the sample. We also found that some firms had listed 
different banks in 1995 and 1998. Firms whose primary bank had merged into another bank (47) or had otherwise 
lost its FDIC certificate
5
 during the period 1995 to 1998 were eliminated from the sample. A small number of firms 
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(12) that had reported a change in primary bank between 1995 and 1998 were also eliminated from the sample. To 
control for economic influences we obtained the quarterly average federal funds rate and gross domestic product 
from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Our sample of 351 observations thus consists of the characteristics of 27 firms, 
their bank and economic variables over the 13 quarters from the fourth quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 1998. 
Transforming the data from levels to percentage changes resulted in 324 observations. The sample of 324 
observations represents our best effort to obtain a usable sample. Our attempts to increase the number of 
observations by increasing the time period over which observations were selected resulted in a loss of firm-bank 
cross-sectional observations. The data and the subsequent analysis reflect much of the difficulties associated with 
obtaining complete, consistent and reliable information on small borrowers and their bank. 
 
If firms were constrained by their bank‟s ability to lend, measures of bank capital would be significant 
determinants of the firm‟s growth. We proxy the dependent variable, the firm‟s growth opportunities, with two 
alternate specifications - the variable SALES is the percentage change in net sales, and ASSETS is the percentage 
change in total assets. In order to determine capital adequacy, bank regulators focus on three alternate specifications 
of capital – CORE, TIER1 and TOTAL represent the fraction by which the core capital ratio, tier1 capital ratio and 
total capital ratio respectively exceed the regulatory requirement for those ratios.
6
 Deterioration in capital adequacy 
is a signal for regulatory scrutiny; hence the bank‟s ability to finance the firm‟s growth is hypothesized to depend on 
the growth in the bank‟s capital ratios. We therefore calculate dCORE as the percentage change in the core capital 
ratio, dTIER1 as the percentage change in the tier1 capital ratio, and dTOTAL as the percentage change in the total 
capital ratio. We control for the firm‟s financial condition that might affect the lending decision - DEBT is the firm‟s 
debt-equity ratio. We also control for general economic conditions – GDP, the percentage change in gross domestic 
product represents the level of economic activity; and FEDF, the percentage change in the federal funds rate 
represents the stance of monetary policy. 
 
The model used to test the hypothesis that the firm‟s growth is linked to the bank‟s capital situation can 
generally be stated as – 
 
pitalGrowthInCasCapitalBankiableControlVarsGrowthFirm
i
ii 54
3,1
''   

  Equation 1 
We tested the general model presented above using two alternate specifications of the firm‟s growth 
(SALES or ASSETS) and three alternate specifications of the bank‟s capital situation (CORE and dCORE, or TIER1 
and dTIER1, or TOTAL and dTOTAL). The results of the six OLS regression analyses presented in table 1 confirm 
that the firm‟s growth opportunities are constrained by their bank‟s ability to lend. 
 
The intercept and the three control variables (GDP, FEDF and DEBT) were insignificant in all 
specifications of our model.
7
 We also find that measures of the level of capital adequacy (CORE, TIER1 and 
TOTAL) were insignificant in all specifications. However, changes in the bank‟s capital adequacy (dCORE, dTIER1 
and dTOTAL) had a positive coefficient and were generally significant determinants of the firm‟s growth.  
 
Conclusions 
 
  It is well recognized that financial markets are characterized by imperfect information. Banks help financial 
markets to overcome asymmetric information by screening, contracting with, and monitoring borrowers. Information 
asymmetry and moral hazard in the transfer of information prevent small firms from seeking alternate sources of 
financing and are often tied to the incumbent bank. Since 1988, bank regulators have emphasized the importance of risk 
based capital adequacy requirements; and since 1991, bank regulators have implemented prompt corrective action, 
mandatory closure, and least cost resolution rules for failure to comply with regulatory requirement. The high cost of 
regulatory sanction creates incentives for banks to adjust their asset allocation to comply with capital standards, and thus 
creates a channel by which regulatory policy may influence economic activity. Our results do not find any evidence to 
suggest that the small firm‟s growth opportunities are constrained by the level of the bank‟s capital relative to regulatory 
norm. Our analysis does confirm that  it is the changes in the bank‟s  capital that consistently and significantly influences 
Table 1 
The relation between the firm’s growth and the bank’s capital 
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The model used to test the hypothesis that the firm’s growth is linked to the bank’s capital situation can generally be 
stated as -  
pitalGrowthInCasCapitalBankiableControlVarsGrowthFirm
i
ii 54
3,1
''   

 
We tested this model using alternate specifications of the firm’s growth (SALES or ASSETS) and the bank’s capital situation 
(CORE and dCORE, or TIER1 and dTIER1, or TOTAL and dTOTAL). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
identify a firm with its bank and link the firm’s growth opportunities to the bank’s capital situation. The results of the six 
OLS regression analyses confirm that the firm’s growth opportunities are constrained by the their bank’s ability to lend. The 
results suggest that it is the changes in the bank’s capital that influence the firm’s growth opportunities, and it is the growth 
of the firm’s assets that is primarily influenced. 
 
Variable Coefficients 
Dependent Variable SALES ASSETS 
Measure of Bank Capital Core Tier1 Total Core Tier1 Total 
       
Intercept 
 
0.03 
(0.29) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.00 
(-0.02) 
-0.01 
(-0.56) 
-0.02 
(-0.71) 
-0.02 
(-1.07) 
GDP 
Percentage change in gross domestic output 
3.87 
(0.66) 
4.35 
(0.75) 
3.77 
(0.65) 
1.66 
(1.13) 
2.01 
(1.36) 
1.88 
(1.27) 
FEDF 
Percentage change in federal funds rate 
0.08 
(0.18) 
0.10 
(0.21) 
0.10 
(0.21) 
0.13 
(1.09) 
0.15 
(1.22) 
0.15 
(1.24) 
DEBT 
Firm‟s debt-equity ratio 
-0.00 
(-0.87) 
-0.00 
(-0.81) 
-0.00 
(-0.89) 
-0.00 
(-1.08) 
-0.00 
(-0.97) 
-0.00 
(-1.05) 
CORE 
Fraction by which the core capital ratio exceeds the 
regulatory requirement 
-0.03 
(-0.68) 
  -0.00 
(-0.16) 
  
dCORE 
Percentage change in the core capital ratio 
0.25 
(1.62) 
  0.12* 
(3.19) 
  
TIER1 
The fraction by which the tier1 capital ratio exceeds 
the regulatory requirement 
 -0.02 
(-0.60) 
  -0.00 
(-0.39) 
 
dTIER1 
Percentage change in the tier1 capital ratio 
 0.26 
(1.65) 
  0.09* 
(2.31) 
 
TOTAL 
The fraction by which the total capital ratio exceeds 
the regulatory requirement 
  -0.02 
(-0.19) 
  0.01 
(0.52) 
dTOTAL 
Percentage change in the total capital ratio 
  0.40* 
(2.13) 
  0.10* 
(2.18) 
DW 2.30 2.30 2.30 1.90 1.91 1.92 
 
Note: * denotes that the coefficient is significant at 5%. The t-statistic is placed below the coefficient in parenthesis 
(n=324). The variables used in our analysis was suggested by accepted theory and prior studies which had used macro 
level data instead of the firm level data employed in this study. Since we were interested in analyzing the firm’s growth 
opportunities and constraints to those opportunities, we transformed variables from levels to percentage changes, 
which confounds interpretation of measures of fit.  
 
 
growth of the firm‟s assets. The evidence does suggest that banks are sensitive to changes in their capital adequacy 
and adjust their lending decisions in response to such changes. Deterioration in a bank‟s capital adequacy may 
therefore result in an allocation of credit to the detriment of small businesses. This pilot study raises implications for 
the manner in which firms form relationships with banks - small firms may be better served by diversifying 
financing sources and forming multiple banking relationships to ensure availability of credit to finance asset growth. 
 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
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Our knowledge of “relationship intermediation”, the manner in which banks and the borrowing firms 
interact has been developing. This interaction is important because it impacts the terms and availability of credit to 
businesses and can influence the firm‟s growth opportunities. At this time, the lack of a clear consensus in the 
theoretic and empirical literature and the need for resolution creates a promising avenue for further research.   
 
Endnotes 
 
1.  A bank may be able to meet risk adjusted capital adequacy requirements and avoid regulatory sanction by 
(for example) decreasing the proportion of business loans which have higher risk weights and increasing 
the proportion of U.S. government securities which have lower risk weights. 
2.  Examples of regulatory influences on capital standards include the International Lending and Supervision 
Act of 1983, Basle Agreement on International Capital Standards of 1987, and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. 
3.  Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) find negative excess stock returns to firms with business dealings 
with Continental Illinois Bank around the time of the banks failure, and positive excess stock returns to 
those firms when the bailout package was announced, supporting the proposition that banking conditions 
affect borrowers. Yamori and Murakami (1999) also find that information sensitive relationships are diffi-
cult to replicate and adversely affect bank customers. Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Hancock and Wilcox 
(1998) discuss the proposition that changes in bank lending affect the aggregate economy. 
4.  The core capital ratio is defined as tier1 capital as a percentage of assets. The tier1 capital ratio is defined as 
tier1 capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. The total capital ratio is defined as total capital as a 
percentage of risk-weighted assets. Details of capital composition are available in Regulation Y (12 CFR 
225 App. A). 
5.  A unique number assigned by the FDIC, which is used to identify institutions, and for the issuance of in-
surance certificates. 
6.  Regulators currently require banks to hold three-percent core capital, four-percent tier 1 capital, and eight-
percent total capital. 
7.  Since many of the small firms in our sample are likely to be influenced by “regional” characteristics, we 
matched the firm to its region as specified by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Com-
merce. We then replaced the GDP variable with the corresponding regional personal income. The interpre-
tation of the regression analysis was qualitatively similar to the original analysis and confirmed the robust-
ness of our results. 
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Notes 
 
1. A bank may be able to meet risk adjusted capital adequacy requirements and avoid regulatory sanction by (for ex-
ample) decreasing the proportion of business loans which have higher risk weights and increasing the proportion of 
U.S. government securities which have lower risk weights. 
2. Examples of regulatory influences on capital standards include the International Lending and Supervision Act of 
1983, Basle Agreement on International Capital Standards of 1987, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991. 
3. Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) find negative excess stock returns to firms with business dealings with Con-
tinental Illinois Bank around the time of the banks failure, and positive excess stock returns to those firms when the 
bailout package was announced, supporting the proposition that banking conditions affect borrowers. Yamori and 
Murakami (1999) also find that information sensitive relationships are difficult to replicate and adversely affect bank 
customers. Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Hancock and Wilcox (1998) discuss the proposition that changes in bank 
lending affect the aggregate economy. 
4. The core capital ratio is defined as tier1 capital as a percentage of assets. The tier1 capital ratio is defined as tier1 
capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. The total capital ratio is defined as total capital as a percentage of 
risk-weighted assets. Details of capital composition are available in Regulation Y (12 CFR 225 App. A). 
5. A unique number assigned by the FDIC, which is used to identify institutions, and for the issuance of insurance 
certificates. 
6. Regulators currently require banks to hold three-percent core capital, four-percent tier 1 capital, and eight-percent 
total capital. 
7. Since many of the small firms in our sample are likely to be influenced by “regional” characteristics, we matched 
the firm to its region as specified by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. We then re-
placed the GDP variable with the corresponding regional personal income. The interpretation of the regression anal-
ysis was qualitatively similar to the original analysis and confirmed the robustness of our results. 
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Table 1 
The relation between the firm’s growth and the bank’s capital 
The model used to test the hypothesis that the firm‟s growth is linked to the bank‟s capital situation can generally be 
stated as -  
pitalGrowthInCasCapitalBankiableControlVarsGrowthFirm
i
ii 54
3,1
''   

 
We tested this model using alternate specifications of the firm‟s growth (SALES or ASSETS) and the bank‟s capital 
situation (CORE and dCORE, or TIER1 and dTIER1, or TOTAL and dTOTAL). To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first study to identify a firm with its bank and link the firm‟s growth opportunities to the bank‟s capital situation. The 
results of the six OLS regression analyses confirm that the firm‟s growth opportunities are constrained by the their 
bank‟s ability to lend. The results suggest that it is the changes in the bank‟s capital that influence the firm‟s growth 
opportunities, and it is the growth of the firm‟s assets that is primarily influenced. 
Variable Coefficients 
Dependent Variable SALES ASSETS 
Measure of Bank Capital Core Tier1 Total Core Tier1 Total 
       
Intercept 
 
0.03 
(0.29) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.00 
(-0.02) 
-0.01 
(-0.56) 
-0.02 
(-0.71) 
-0.02 
(-1.07) 
GDP 
Percentage change in gross domestic output 
3.87 
(0.66) 
4.35 
(0.75) 
3.77 
(0.65) 
1.66 
(1.13) 
2.01 
(1.36) 
1.88 
(1.27) 
FEDF 
Percentage change in federal funds rate 
0.08 
(0.18) 
0.10 
(0.21) 
0.10 
(0.21) 
0.13 
(1.09) 
0.15 
(1.22) 
0.15 
(1.24) 
DEBT 
Firm‟s debt-equity ratio 
-0.00 
(-0.87) 
-0.00 
(-0.81) 
-0.00 
(-0.89) 
-0.00 
(-1.08) 
-0.00 
(-0.97) 
-0.00 
(-1.05) 
CORE 
Fraction by which the core capital ratio exceeds the 
regulatory requirement 
-0.03 
(-0.68) 
  -0.00 
(-0.16) 
  
dCORE 
Percentage change in the core capital ratio 
0.25 
(1.62) 
  0.12* 
(3.19) 
  
TIER1 
The fraction by which the tier1 capital ratio exceeds 
the regulatory requirement 
 -0.02 
(-0.60) 
  -0.00 
(-0.39) 
 
dTIER1 
Percentage change in the tier1 capital ratio 
 0.26 
(1.65) 
  0.09* 
(2.31) 
 
TOTAL 
The fraction by which the total capital ratio exceeds 
the regulatory requirement 
  -0.02 
(-0.19) 
  0.01 
(0.52) 
dTOTAL 
Percentage change in the total capital ratio 
  0.40* 
(2.13) 
  0.10* 
(2.18) 
DW 2.30 2.30 2.30 1.90 1.91 1.92 
Note: * denotes that the coefficient is significant at 5%. The t-statistic is placed below the coefficient in parenthesis 
(n=324). The variables used in our analysis was suggested by accepted theory and prior studies which had used 
macro level data instead of the firm level data employed in this study. Since we were interested in analyzing the 
firm‟s growth opportunities and constraints to those opportunities, we transformed variables from levels to 
percentage changes, which confounds interpretation of measures of fit.  
 
 
